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FISHER AND JAMES HIJACK THE MCDONNELL
DOUGLAS PARADIGM, REWRITING DISCRIMINATION
LAW IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT: AN EXPLANATION FOR
THE HIGH RATE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
DISCRIMINATION LAWSUITS
RICHARD J. PERRY, JR.
It has long been recognized that employment discrimination
plaintiffs suffer from an inordinately high rate of summary judg-
ment. 1 As Judge Bennett has stated:
In my view, summary judgments are inappropriately
granted in a shocking number of employment discrimina-
tion cases. This is hardly a new or novel view. Nearly 20
years ago, professor Ann McGinley recognized that the
Trilogy had a "profound effect of increased use of sum-
mary judgment in defeating civil rights claims" and that
"[t]his increased use of summary judgment to dispose of
civil rights actions has deprived plaintiffs of the fairer,
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1 "While federal plaintiffs bringing non-employment discrimination cases succeed
in approximately fifty percent of cases, employment discrimination plaintiff
succeeded only fifteen percent of cases." Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue,
Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short, Simple Suggestion for Addressing
Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and Summary
Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 749, 752 (2012-13).
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more accurate decision-making assured by a fact finder's
decision at trial."2
One reason for this, at least in the Second Circuit, is a trend
to redefine the elements of the discrimination prima facie case and
ultimately the term primafacie in the context of discrimination law.
Activist judges in the Second Circuit appear to be motivated by
dissatisfaction with the probative weight afforded to circumstantial
evidence. These judges are hijacking the McDonnell Douglas para-
digm, rewriting the law to the detriment of discrimination plaintiffs.
The primary culprit in this intellectual theft is the Fisher v.
Vassar College decision.3 It plays the role of Frankenstein's Monster
in this tragedy; an amalgamation of untenable concoctions that defy
understood law. Playing the part of Dr. Frankenstein is James v. New
York Racing Association,4 which grants Fisher an unnatural and false
life after Fisher was abrogated by the Supreme Court in Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing.5 These cases are cited again and again by
courts in the Second Circuit to steal jury verdicts from plaintiffs and
to prevent plaintiffs from presenting their case to ajury at all.
But there are other issues present as well. Courts, over the
last 40 some odd years, have attempted to redefine the specific
elements that make up aprimafacie case. This "redefinition" heigh-
tens the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs to make out their prima
facie cases while simultaneously recasting the prima facie case as 'de
minimus.' Courts then take this to mean that any evidence offered to
2 Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From the "No Spittin, No Cussing and No Summary
Judgment" Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the "Defendants
Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment" Days: One Judges Four Decade
Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 685, 708-09 (2012-13).
3 Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997). Fisher was a hotly contested
en banc review with two dissents. As discussed below, the Supreme Court in
Reeves clearly sided with the dissents reasoning. Nevertheless, a single panel in
James specifically holds that they have reviewed Fisher in light of Reeves and find
there to be no disagreement between the Circuit's jurisprudence and the Supreme
Court's.
' James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2000).
5 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
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support aprimafacie case of discrimination is intrinsically of little or
no probative value. These courts are undermining the express pur-
pose of McDonnell Douglas and Title VII.
The underlying problem leading to this flawed jurisprudence
seems to be that courts, particularly this circuit, for the last two
decades have forgotten the basic principles that the Supreme Court
6
enunciated four decades ago in McDonnell Douglas. Starting with
McDonnell Douglas, courts have time and again recognized that
defendants who discriminate deliberately hide evidence of their
discriminatory intent. This was the reason the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting process was created . But these newer cases appear
to be founded on the activist judge's dissatisfaction with circumstan-
tial evidence as proof
Worse, Fisher and James, while paying lip service to the
Supreme Court in generalities, in detail appear to deliberately ignore
the teachings of McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, Hicks and Reeves;
hand-waving away the legitimate presumption identified in McDon-
nell Douglas in favor of several implicit presumptions in favor of the
defendants that find no support in any Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The effect of Fisher through James is 'evidence of a primafacie case
creates a presumption of discrimination, but if the employer
articulates it legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, it
implicitly creates a presumption of non-discrimination.' This is not
the law the Supreme Court has enunciated. It is quite clear that the
Second Circuit's activism must be brought to heel.
Because this flawed jurisprudence has completely ignored the
bases and underpinnings of the McDonnell Douglass burden shifting
scheme, is it necessary to reexamine each in some detail. The first
section, below, will examine the McDonnell Douglas paradigm,
covering the purpose of Title VII, the rarity of overt evidence of
discrimination, the evidentiary standard for the prima facie case, the
presumption created by the prima facie case and its meaning, the
defendant's proffer of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (LNDR)
6 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7Id.
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for its actions and the methodology and the meaning of a showing of
pretext.
The second section will examine the changing articulation of
the elements of the prima facie case, at least within the Second
Circuit, the Fisher majority's attempt to rewrite the definition of the
term prima facie and the James panel's erroneous resurrection of
Fisher after it was disposed of by the Supreme Court in Reeves.
The third section will offer some examples, some brief and
some more thorough case studies, showing how Reeves and James
have successfully hijacked McDonnell Douglas prima facie para-
digm in the Second Circuit.
I. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PARADIGM
A. Purpose of Title VII
Title VII was created to effectuate an important national
policy: the elimination of unlawful, arbitrary discrimination through-
out the nation's workforce. The Supreme Court reiterates this initial
premise at least three times in the body of its McDonnell Douglas
decision.
"The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of
Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have
fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of
minority citizens." 9
"What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification." 10
8 See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,716 (1983) ("The
prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect
an important national policy.").
9 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 800.
10 Id. (internal quotation marks removed) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 429 (1971)).
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And again "[t]here are societal as well as personal interests
on both sides of this equation. The broad, overriding interest, shared
by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy
workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment
and personnel decisions." 11
The Supreme Court finishes this premise with the statement
that "[un the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly clear
that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or other-
wise.",12 In referencing "subtle" discrimination the Supreme Court is
eluding to one of the greatest problems that discrimination plaintiffs
face: employers who discriminate take pains to hide their discrimi-
natory intent.
B. Factual Questions of Intent are Difficult to
Prove
It is well recognized that questions fact about an individual's
intent are very difficult to know or prove. The Supreme Court used
the following colorful description to illustrate the point in Aikens:
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his
digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a
man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as
much a fact as anything else." 13 And the ultimate burden that the
Plaintiff in a disparate treatment discrimination case must show
necessarily includes the discriminatory intent of the employer or the
individual bad actors. But the defendants in discrimination case are
usually disinclined to admit their discriminatory intent. So how
should/can a plaintiff go about proving this elusive datum?
11 1d. at 801.
12 id.
13 Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716-17 (internal quotations removed) (quoting Eddington v.
Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885)).
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C. Rarity of Overt Evidence of Discriminatory
Intent
In 1963, it may have been legal to have openly discrimina-
tory policies. A store might advertise for new employees with the
caveat that blacks need not apply. Or a factory might enjoin its hiring
department from considering females in employment. One could
certainly imagine more offensively worded policies. However, once
Title VII went into effect in 1964, employers with such facially
discriminatory policies would lose as soon as lawsuits could be filed.
So the policies disappeared effectively overnight. But, the discrimi-
natory intent that drove those policies in the first place didn't
magically cease to exist with the enactment of the federal law.
The Courts have recognized this fact again and again. In
Aikens the Supreme Court stated "all courts have recognized that the
question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive
and difficult... There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to
the employer's mental processes." 14 This statement was reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court in Hicks.
15
After all, "[a]n employer who discriminates is unlikely to
leave a 'smoking gun,' such as a notation in an employee's personnel
file, attesting to a discriminatory intent." 16 As the Second Circuit
summarized succinctly in Dister v. Cont. Group, Inc:
The allocation of burdens and imposition of presumptions
in Title VII and ADEA cases recognizes the reality that
direct evidence of discrimination is difficult to find
precisely because its practitioners deliberately try to hide
14Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
15 St. Maly's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993) ("[T]he question
facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult. The
prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect
an important national policy. There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the
employer's mental processes." (internal quotation marks removed) (quoting Aikens,
460 U.S. at 716)).
16 Rosenv. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir.199 1).
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it. Employers of a mind to act contrary to law seldom
note such a motive in their employee's personnel dossier.
Specific intent will only rarely be demonstrated by
"smoking gun" proof, or by "'eyewitness' testimony as to
the employer's mental processes.17
And again, in Chambers, the Second Circuit reiterated "the fact that
[e]mployers are rarely so cooperative as to include a notation in the
personnel file that their actions are motivated by factors expressly
forbidden by law." 18
Thus, the premise that employers who discriminate actively
hide their discriminatory intent is well established. This leaves courts
and discrimination plaintiffs then faced with a problem. How to
effectuate this important national policy in light of the fact that
discriminating employers deliberately hide evidence of their efforts
to flaunt the law?
This question was answered by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas.
D. The Evidentiary Requirements Necessary to
Meet the Prima Facie Burden
Acknowledging the preceding points; the important purpose
of Title VII (and affiliated statutes like the ADA and ADEA); the
usual difficulty in proving intent; and the rarity of overt evidence of
discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
created a scheme of evidentiary burden shifting that would enable a
discrimination plaintiff to prove the ultimate question-that the
employer subjected the employee to an adverse action because of the
employer's discriminatory intent-exclusively through circumstan-
tial evidence.
17 Dister v. Cont. Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal citations
omitted).
18 Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation removed) (quoting Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 464
(2d Cir. 1989)).
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This purpose has been acknowledged again and again by the
Supreme Court. As Justice O'Connor put it, "the entire purpose of
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the
fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come
by." 19 The Supreme Court in Burdine explained "In a Title VII case,
the allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by the
establishment of a prima facie case is intended progressively to
sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination.,
20
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff does not have a heavy
burden to raise an inference of discrimination. The Supreme Court
has described the evidentiary burden for a prima facie case as "not
onerous." 21 The elements recited in McDonnell Douglass itself were:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's qualifications.22
The court went on to recognize that "[t]he facts necessarily
will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima
facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in
every respect to differing factual situations. 23 Below, Section II
below will deal with this concept in more detail, at least as far as
identifying the dangers of imprecise articulations of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case. It is important to analyze the elements
24themselves, since subsequent case law and commentary ascribe
19 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989).
20 Texas Dept. of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
211d. at 253.22 McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. 792.
23 
_d. at 802, n. 13.
24 The subsequent case law and commentary are largely the subject of Point II and
Point III three below.
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differing import and meaning both to the individual elements and the
primafacie case as a whole.
From the language of McDonnell Douglas, the Court has
clearly identified four elements in the prima facie case that Mr.
Green made out. 25 The Court does not specifically say that there have
to be four elements but lower courts have traditionally described
prima facie cases as having four. This is not necessarily a correct
analysis.
One of the problems with reading these primafacie elements
and extrapolating a more generic set of prima facie elements is that
these elements are laid out in chronological order. First comes the
protected class, then the application and qualification for the job,
then the refusal to hire and finally that the employer still needed the
work to be done.
Described more generically and ignoring the chronological
order of specific facts, the plaintiff 1) identified his protected class,
2) identified an adverse employment action that he suffered and
3) disposed of the most common reasons for the adverse employment
action.
While this third element of generic articulation is not
explicitly identified in the McDonnell Douglas articulation, the
Supreme Court has said repeatedly that this is what they meant. It is
perhaps most explicit in Burdine. "The prima facie case serves an
important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection. ,26 Burdine
was citing a somewhat more convoluted statement from Teamsters
which culminated with "Elimination of these reasons for the refusal
to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create an inference
that the decision was a discriminatory one."27
25 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
26 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
27 "Although the McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of
discrimination, it does demand that the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least
that his rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate reasons on
which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack
of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought. Elimination of these
reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create an
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So, the elements of a prima facie case must be 1) identifying
a protected class, 2) identifying adverse employment action, and 3)
disposing of most common reasons for that adverse employment
action.28 In McDonnell Douglass this third element was split
between two sub-elements and presented as four elements. The sub
elements were that a) the employee had applied for and was qualified
for the job and b) the employer was still seeking applicants for the
job.29 This is because the two most common (lawful) reasons for an
employer to refuse to hire someone are because the applicant is not
qualified or there are no vacancies in the work force.
So the employee must then prove that these two most
common reasons are not true. This is most easily accomplished by
proving the opposite: that a) the plaintiff was qualified to do the work
and b) the employer was still seeking applicants. In doing so, the
plaintiff eliminates the most common reasons for the adverse action
and becomes entitled to an inference of discrimination.3 °
These elements are applicable in termination cases as well.
Though, as mentioned below in section two, some courts have
articulated the prima facie elements as requiring a showing that the
position was filled with someone outside the protected class this is
incorrect. Even the Supreme Court described the formulation in this
manner in St. Mary's Honor Center, though this was just a recitation
of the lack of dispute on the point by the parties. 31 The Dissent
addresses this point specifically.
"The majority, following the courts below, mentions that
Hicks's position was filled by a white male." But "[t]his Court has
inference that the decision was a discriminatory one." Intl. Broth. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).2 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
29 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
30 Intl. Broth. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358.
31 "Petitioners do not challenge the District Court's finding that respondent satisfied
the minimal requirements of such a prima facie case (set out in McDonnell
Douglas, supra, at 802) by proving (1) that he is black, (2) that he was qualified for
the position of shift commander, (3) that he was demoted from that position and
ultimately discharged, and (4) that the position remained open and was ultimately
filled by a white man." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993).
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not directly addressed the question whether the personal characteris-
tics of someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff are material,
and that issue is not before us today. 32 And, other courts who have
addressed the issue have declared it irrelevant, in keeping with the
plain language of McDonnell Douglas.33
And as an initial matter, (at trial is should be noted) theprima
facie case will create a mandatory, rebuttable presumption that
discrimination was indeed the real reason for the adverse action.34
E. The Prima Facie Case is, by Definition,
Sufficient to Allow an Inference of
Discrimination
Before turning to the presumption of discrimination that
arises out of a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, it is
necessary to examine the proposition that aprimafacie case creates a
permissible inference of discrimination as a juridical matter. This
may seem superfluous, given that a prima facie case, by definition,
raises an inference of the ultimate fact the case is designed to
prove.35 Unfortunately, as will be explored Section III, the Second
32 "The majority, following the courts below, mentions that Hicks's position was
filled by a white male. Ante, at 2747 (citing the District Court's opinion); see 970
F.2d 487, 491, n. 7 (CA8 1992). This Court has not directly addressed the question
whether the personal characteristics of someone chosen to replace a Title VII
plaintiff are material, and that issue is not before us today. Cf. Cunpiano v. Banco
Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 154-55 (CAI 1990) (identity of replacement
is not relevant)" (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 527 n.1
(1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
33 Furthermore, although certain courts- including the district court in this action
-have required an employee, in making out a prima facie case, to demonstrate that
she was replaced by a person outside the protected class, see Lee v. Russell County
Board of Education, 684 F.2d 769, 773 [1996] (1 1th Cir. 1982); Wade v. New York
Telephone Co., 500 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), we believe such a stan-
dard is inappropriate and at odds with the policies underlying Title VII; Meiri v.
Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1985).
31 It is well to recall that McDonnell Douglas v. Green was an appeal from a trial
verdict. Clearly the evidence offered in that matter survived to get to a jury.
35 "Evidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory
evidence is produced." Black's Law Dictionary, 9 th Edition, pg. 638.
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Circuit has purported to identify a new type of prima facie case,
heretofore unknown and stemming from McDonnell Douglas and its
progeny specifically for discrimination plaintiffs.
Nothing in Supreme Court jurisprudence identifies a third
type of prima facie case, as in one that does not raise a permissible
inference of discrimination. To the contrary, the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence specifically states that primafacie cases are sufficient
to create instances of discrimination.3 6 "Elimination of these reasons
for the refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create
",37an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one.
More so, the Supreme Court in Burdine has specifically
identified what definition of prima facie case it used in McDonnell
Douglas.
The phrase "prima facie case" not only may denote the
establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption,
but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiffs bur-
den of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to
infer the fact at issue. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2494 (3d ed.
1940). McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that
in the Title VII context we use "prima facie case" in the
38former sense .
The Supreme Court cites to Wigmore to identify the two types of
primafacie case: 1) primafacie cases that raise rebuttable presump-
tions and 2) primafacie cases that raise permissible inferences. As
the court specifically says "McDonnell Douglas should have made it
apparent that in the Title VII context we use 'prima facie case' in the
former sense.
'
,
39
Turning to Wigmore, it is made plain that "The term 'Prima
facie evidence' or 'Prima facie case' is used in two senses., 40 The
36 Intl. Broth. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358, 396.
37id.
3
'Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
3 9 id.
4 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2494 (3d ed. 1940).
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'two senses' are presented in exactly the same order as the Supreme
Court presented them. The first is where the party has "not only
removed by sufficient evidence the duty ofproducing evidence to get
past the judge to the jury, but has gone further, and, either by means
of a presumption or by a general mass of strong evidence, has
entitled himself to a ruling that the opponent should fail if he does
nothing more in the way of producing evidence"
41
The second is "Where the proponent, having fulfilled that
duty, satisfied the judge, and may properly claim that the jury be
allowed to consider his case. This sufficiency of evidence to go to the
jury... is also often referred to as a prima facie case" 42 Wigmore then
goes on to contrast this with admissible but insufficient evidence.
By definition, either of these two prima facie cases is
sufficient to go to a jury. The first version has the added weight of a
presumption, obligating the opposing party offer evidence in rebuttal.
This first version is the version of the Supreme Court chose to
employ in McDonnell Douglas.
This bears repeating: by definition, either of these two prima
facie cases is sufficient to go to a jury. Yet, so very many discrimina-
tion plaintiffs with valid prima facie cases lose at summary judg-
ment. In the Second Circuit, the reason for this appears to stem from
two very flawed cases.
F. The Defendant's LNDR
Having made out a primafacie case the plaintiff is initially
entitled to judgment as a matter of law unless the defendant explains
the reasons for the adverse employment action.43 The mandatory
judgment if the defendant remains silent is a compelling reason for
the defendant to explain the reason for its decision. This is where the
41id.
42id.
41 "Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes
the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in
the case." Burdine, 450 U.S. 248.
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defendant articulates a legitimate non-discriminatory reason (LNDR)
for its actions.44
In articulating this LNDR the defendant does not carry the
burden of persuasion.45 The defendant does, however, have an
evidentiary burden. The defendant may not get by with nothing more
than an allegation. To the contrary, the defendant is obligated to offer
evidence that supports its LNDR. "The defendant must clearly set
forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons
for the plaintiffs rejection., 46 Further, "an articulation not admitted
into evidence will not suffice. Thus, the defendant cannot meet its
burden merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument of
counsel. 47 And the evidence offered must be sufficient "to frame the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext., 48 So the defendant must
meet its burden by entering into evidence facts, which support the
identified LNDR and are sufficiently detailed that the plaintiff can
test the asserted facts for evidence of pretext.
For example, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for ter-
minating someone is that they were a bad employee i.e. poor work
performance. Simply stating in a brief that the employee exhibited
poor work performance does not articulate an LNDR. Nor should it.
Poor work performance is a conclusory assertion. The employer has
to identify the person or persons who made the decision and identify
"with sufficient clarity" the underlying facts from which the
decision-maker reached the conclusion.
What data indicated poor work performance? If the employer
is silent on this issue, the plaintiff cannot test the supposedly legiti-
mate non-discriminatory reason for pretext. Did the employee exhibit
" "The burden of producing evidence that the adverse employment actions were
taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (citing
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254) (internal quotations omitted).
15 "The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (1981) (citing Board of Trustees of
Keene State College v. Sweeny, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1979)).46 Id. at 25547 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256
48Id. at 255-56
100
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chronic absenteeism? Chronic absenteeism could be a legitimate
reason to terminate employee. But, if so, there should be time and
attendance records to support this. The employer has to identify the
data that it relied upon to reach its conclusions so that the plaintiff
has an opportunity to evaluate the data to see, for instance, if
individuals outside of the plaintiffs protected class who had similar
absenteeism nonetheless retained their jobs. If the employer usually
turns a blind eye to chronic absenteeism except for the plaintiff, this
constitutes evidence of pretext, supporting the ultimate conclusion
that the plaintiff was targeted because of a protected characteristic.
49
As Burdine instructs, it is only when the defendant has
supported its alleged LNDR with evidence of "sufficient clarity so
that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext" that the defendant will have met its burden. If the defendant
doesn't meet this burden it fails to rebut the presumption of the prima
facie case.
But, even when the articulation is successful, meaning the
defendant has met its burden; the defendant has only raised a triable
question of fact. 50 That is, the plaintiff created a permissible infer-
ence of discrimination with the prima facie case. The prima facie
case also, initially, created a mandatory presumption of discrimina-
tion. The defendant by meeting its burden in proffering an LNDR
eliminated the mandatory presumption and created a permissible
inference of nondiscrimination. This leaves two contradictory
permissible inferences that the fact finder must choose between. The
fact finder is entitled to choose which of these it believes51 "for the
'9 "Especially relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees
involved in acts against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in' were
nevertheless retained or rehired." McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804-05.
50 "The employer need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the
trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been
motivated by discriminatory animus." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257.
51 "The facifinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together
with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimina-
tion. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact
to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511
(citing Burdine 450 U.S. at 254 (internal quotations omitted)).
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burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the
credibility-assessment stage.' '52
It is at this point, i.e. at trial, that the plaintiff is given the
opportunity to demonstrate the falsity of the LNDR either by show-
ing facts that are offered are themselves false or by showing that
even if the alleged facts are true, that they were not the real reason
the employer chose to act as it did.53
G. The Attack on the LNDR-Showing Pretext
It must be kept in mind, that there are two basic types of
challenge to a proffered LNDR.54 The first is whether or not the
underlying facts that defendant offered in support of its reason are
true. The second is whether, even if the underlying facts are true, the
articulated reason was the 'real' reason. In other words, was their an
ulterior motive?
55
Keeping with the example above, where the employer asserts
poor work performance as the reason for the adverse action, the first
challenge is to the underlying asserted facts: did the employee exhibit
poor work performance? Was the employee actually absent? How
often? What evidence did the employer offer to show the absentee-
ism? Did the employer offer regular business records? Are docu-
52 1d. at 509 (citing Burdine 450 U.S. at 254).
51 "Either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
51 "[T]wo questions-one objective and one subjective-must be decided. The
first, objective question is whether the reason given by the employer is one that is
legitimate under Title VI." Ricci v. Destafano, 07-1428, 1 (U.S. 6-29-2009) (Alito,
J., concurring).
55 "If the reason provided by the employer is not legitimate on its face, the
employer is liable. Id. at 509. The second, subjective question concerns the
employer's intent, If an employer offers a facially legitimate reason for its decision
but it turns out that this explanation was just a pretext for discrimination, the
employer is again liable. See id. at 510-512." Ricci v. Destafano, 07-1428, 1 (U.S.
6-29-2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
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ments created after the litigation started? Did the employer offer
testimony in support of the alleged absenteeism?
The defendant has to offer sufficient detail, so that the plain-
tiff has an opportunity to attack the offered evidence. After all, the
defendant could certainly fabricate a reason in order to save itself
from liability.56 In fact, such potential fabrication by defendant was a
major concern of the dissent in St. Mary's. Even the majority
acknowledged the danger stating "Perjury may purchase the defen-
dant a chance at the factfinder. 57 Disproving the alleged facts under-
lying the asserted reason is one method of showing pretext.
What is often missed at this point is that the plaintiff does not
have to disprove the underlying facts. This second scenario was the
one which obtained in McDonnell Douglas. There, there was no
dispute that the plaintiff had engaged in at least some unlawful
conduct against the employer. 58 The actual question was whether or
not the unlawful conduct was the 'real' reason for the adverse
action.59
In essence, the court recognized that the employer could very
well have been thinking 'we need to bring some people back from
layoff but we really don't want to let that black guy, Green, back into
the building ... Wait, he was involved in that stall-in ... We'll just
use that as the reason not to let him back.' It is because of the
possibility of this type of thinking, or something similar, that the
Supreme Court went on to identify mechanics to be used in showing
56 "A satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the legally mandatory
inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonetheless,
this evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the
trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual.
Indeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined
with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the
defendant's explanation." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.57 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522.
58 "Respondent admittedly had taken part in a carefully planned 'stall-in,' designed
to tie up access to and egress from petitioner's plant at a peak traffic hour."
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 803.
59 "While Title VII does not, without more, compel rehiring of respondent, neither
does it permit petitioner to use respondent's conduct as a pretext for the sort of
discrimination prohibited by s 703(a)(1)." Id. at 804.
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pretext, even where the underlying facts supporting the alleged
reason were admitted.
The Supreme Court noted "especially relevant to such a
showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts
against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in' were
nevertheless retained or rehired. Petitioner may justifiably refuse to
rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it,
but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races." 60
These types of individuals are usually called similarly situated
comparators.
The Court then went on to identify several other factors that
would be probative of pretext, such as defendant's prior treatment of
the plaintiff, defendant's treatment of others within the protected
class, defendant's reaction to any complaints plaintiff might have
brought, and statistical evidence.61
The court summarized this non-exhaustive list with the state-
ment: "In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presump-
tively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a cover-up for a
racially discriminatory decision. 62 In sum, there are a variety of
ways that a plaintiff may attack a defendant's LNDR. Any of them
reinforce the plaintiffs prima facie showing and allow for the fact
finder to infer the answer to the ultimate question: that the defendant
subjected the plaintiff to an adverse action for an unlawful discrimi-
natory reason.
6 0 id.
61 "Other evidence that may be relevant to any showing of pretext includes facts as
to the petitioner's treatment of respondent during his prior term of employment;
petitioner's reaction, if any, to respondent's legitimate civil rights activities; and
petitioner's general policy and practice with respect to minority employment. On
the latter point, statistics as to petitioner's employment policy and practice may be
helpful to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to rehire respondent in this
case conformed to a general pattern of discrimination against blacks." Id. at 804-05
(internal citations omitted).62id.
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H. The End State of McDonnell Douglas-What
Goes to the Jury and What the Jury Can Do
With It
The culmination of the evidentiary submissions under the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm is a collection of evidence that is
placed before the jury. The point is to marshal evidence for both
sides. Since the plaintiff has the burden of proof, it is obliged to offer
evidence to meet that burden. Under other circumstances, the defen-
dant could decline to offer any evidence whatsoever. However,
McDonnell Douglas demands that the defendant at least offer evi-
dence that supports its explanation for its actions.
Obviously, the plaintiff will want to present the strongest
case possible supporting an inference of discrimination. Just as
obviously, the defendant will deny any wrongdoing. As described
above, because of the usual paucity of evidence showing discrimina-
tion, the plaintiff will most likely have to rely on circumstantial
evidence.
Clearly, the plaintiff believes that he or she was wronged and
that unlawful discrimination was the reason for that wrong. Just as
clearly, the defendant denies engaging in any sort of discriminatory
conduct.
This is the ultimate question: did the defendant harm the
plaintiff for an unlawful discriminatory reason?
The jury is presented at the outset with two choices:
1) Discrimination?
2) No discrimination?
The jury is also presented with several sets of evidence to
help decide between these two choices.
The primafacie case is evidence that is sufficient to go to the
jury. It raises a valid inference, one that the jury, if it is so inclined,
may employ. That is, if a plaintiff: identifies the protected class,
identifies the adverse employment action and disposes of the most
common reasons for the adverse action then: the jury is allowed to
infer that discrimination was the reason for the adverse action. In
other words, the reason for the adverse action was the protected
classification. And, as an initial matter, that inference is mandatory,
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vol. XXXIII
creating a compelling reason for the employer to offer an explanation
for its actions.
If the defendant offers an LNDR, then the mandatory pre-
sumption ceases. But it is only the presumption that ceases to exist.
The permissible inference remains. This is a legitimate, discretionary
inference that a fact finder may or may not choose to employ. Now,
the jury is called upon to pick between the two possible choices:
discrimination OR no discrimination.
To do this, the jury may infer discrimination from only the
primafacie case. The jury may infer discrimination jointly from the
primafacie case and their disbelief in the employers LNDR. The jury
is also entitled to find that the prima facie case and their simple
disbelief in the employer's proffered reason are still insufficient to
convince them, but that other evidence offered by the plaintiff to
show pretext (such as similarly situated comparators, statistical
evidence, corporate culture, pejorative terms, etc.) did finally con-
vince them that discrimination was the 'real' reason.
The jury may also decline to infer discrimination from the
prima facie case. The jury could be swayed by the employer's
LNDR into believing that no discrimination occurred. The jury is
also entitled to find that the prima facie case and any showing of
pretext are still insufficient to convince them that the discrimination
was the 'real' reason for the adverse action. If there is no other
evidence of record, the jury will decide against plaintiff.
But, because of the erroneous teachings of the Second Cir-
cuit, especially Fisher and James,63 courts are refusing to allow
juries to consider these cases at all. Summary judgment is being
granted at a very high rate. Summary judgment dismissing discrimi-
nation cases is being granted in decisions that clearly show that the
courts do not evaluate discrimination cases using the clear teachings
of McDonnell Douglas and its progeny. These cases are citing to
Fisher and James and their derivatives as justification for disposing
of a perfectly sufficient discrimination case, frequently culminating
61 James, 233 F.3d 149; Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1367.
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in the statement that "no reasonable juror could find discrimination
based on this evidence," or words to that effect.
Thus a single judge, following erroneous teachings from the
Second Circuit, substitutes his or her judgment for not only a panel
of 12 jurors, but in fact of all potential jurors in the entire country.
These rulings are engaging in metaphysics, asserting without any
proof that it would be impossible to find 12 reasonable people in the
entire country who would agree with the plaintiff s evaluation of the
evidence. This is done despite the fact that "The court's role in deci-
ding a motion for summary judgment 'is to identify factual issues,
not to resolve them. ,,64 A district judge's ability to perceive the full
spectrum of what reasonable jurors may or may not conclude is
intrinsically suspect as the Second Circuit appropriately recognized
in a sexual harassment context.65
Abdallah v. Napolitano66 : A Case Study
Consider the following case under the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm outlined above:
A man, of Arab descent, was born in Tunisia and raised a
Muslim. Later he converted to Christianity, immigrated to the United
States, became a citizen, and found a job as an armed officer of the
federal government. Allegedly, an informant for a federal counter-
terrorism task force stated that there was a Tunisian at a federal
academy who had expressed interest in helping someone arrange for
a fraudulent marriage.
The federal counterterrorism task force identified the only
Tunisian in the academy at that time. The investigation was handed
64 Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Jasco
Tools, Inc. v. Dana Corp., 574 F.3d 129, 156 (2d Cir. 2009)).
65 "Whatever the early life of a federal judge, she or he usually lives in a narrow
segment of the enormously broad American socio-economic spectrum, generally
lacking the current real-life experience required in interpreting subtle sexual
dynamics of the workplace based on nuances, subtle perceptions, and implicit
communications." Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998).
66 Abdallah v. Napolitano, 909 F. Supp. 2d 196, 207 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (reconsi-
deration denied) (Feb. 22, 2013).
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over to that department's internal investigative agency, to take lead.
The agents then proceeded to interrogate the man - several times.
The agents also interrogated his family members. These interroga-
tions focused on his "path to citizenship," his religion, how he met
his wife, and whether or not he associated with others of Middle
Eastern descent. During the investigation the man was subjected to a
polygraph, compared to 9/11 terrorists, threatened with physical
harm, and threatened with the loss of his family as well as prison
67time.
The government ultimately concluded it had no basis to
charge the man with any crime, but the agents then compelled the
man to sit for what is known as a "Kalkines" interview. The agents
reported the man to be 'uncooperative' during this interview and the
man was terminated from his employment as a matter of course with
no opportunity to present his side of the story. There was no dispute
that Mr. Abdallah was otherwise performing his duties satisfactorily.
There was no dispute that the work Mr. Abdallah was doing still
needed to be performed.
After being terminated, the agents involved then requested
that the man to help them investigate a local grocery store owned by
Arabs. They intimated that his cooperation would help him get his
job back. The Government admitted or otherwise remained silent
regarding all of these alleged facts.68
67 "The District Court judge sanitized these facts (in favor of the government) in his
decision with the following list: (1) No one else from plaintiff's FLETC class was
questioned about Mr. Abdelqader (see Pltff. Exh. 9, pp. 111-12); (2) The agents
directed their questions to plaintiff on the basis of his alleged association with other
Arabs (see Pltff. Exh. 4, p. 79); (3) The agents asked plaintiff's father-in-law about
plaintiff's religion (see Pltff. Exh. 2, p. 20); (4) Plaintiff was initially identified by
the CS as a Tunisian CBP officer in Buffalo (see id at 48); (5) SA Ford questioned
plaintiff about his "path to citizenship" (Pltff. Exh. 4, p. 71); (6) Plaintiff testified at
his deposition that, during the polygraph examination, SA Witham accused plaintiff
of being a terrorist (Pltff. Exh. 3, p. 61); (7) After his discharge, ICE agents used
plaintiff in an attempt to infiltrate Arab-owned grocery stores (Pltff. Exh. 4, pp. 83-
84)." Abdallah, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 207.68Abdallah, 909 F. Supp. 2d 196.
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Is it reasonable to conclude that Mr. Abdallah was targeted
for termination because of his race, national origin and/or religion?
First Step Prima Facie Case
Evaluating this evidence through the McDonnell Douglas
methodology outlined above results in the following evidence sup-
porting aprimafacie case:
" Protected Classes: Arab, Muslim, Middle Eastern National
Origin
69
" Adverse Employment Action: Termination
" Dispose of the Most Common Reasons for the Adverse
Action: 1) poor work performance-defendant acknowl-
edged that Mr. Abdallah was performing his duties satisfac-
torily, 2) work no longer being done-there was no dispute
that the customs and border patrol duties performed by Mr.
Abdallah continued even after termination.
This evidence makes out a prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas. Therefore, a factfinder is permitted to infer the ultimate
question of discrimination this evidence.
Second Step LNDR
Defendant next proffered a supposedly legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for the termination. The reason offered was the
'Kalkines' interview and Mr. Abdallah's alleged non-cooperation.
7 0
69 For simplicity, race and ethnicity are here being viewed as effectively the same
thing.
7' The so-called Kalkines warning was created in the same vein as Miranda to
obligate the Government to take certain steps before it could threaten an employee
with the loss of employment for refusing to answer a question. Kalkines v. U.S.,
473 F.2d 1391, 1394 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 16, 1973). Specifically, if an employee refuses to
answer a question on the grounds of Fifth Amendment immunity, then the govern-
ment is forbidden from compelling an answer through the threat of termination of
employment unless the government first advises the employee that they are
granting him immunity from prosecution. Id.
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The plaintiff did not accept that the articulation was sufficient
for a variety of reasons. 71 The operative point here being that the
plaintiff raised serious questions about the legitimacy of the prof-
fered LNDR. A jury would therefore have been entitled to reject the
proffer, leaving the mandatory presumption in effect.
Attack on the LNDR
Even if the challenge of sufficiency was unsuccessful, there
was ample evidence sufficient for an attack on the defendant's
LNDR: similarly situated comparators-no one else was questioned
about Mr. Abdallah; the agents questioning based on the plaintiffs
association with other Arabs; the agents questioning about the vera-
city of his conversion to Christianity; the agents questioning about
"his path to citizenship;" the physical and emotional threats; the
direct comparison of Mr. Abdallah to the 9/11 terrorists. All of this
evidence constitutes a valid attack on defendant's LNDR as well as
supporting the ultimate inference of discrimination. There can be no
doubt that the government would not have investigated, for example,
Mr. Christiansen, a devout Mormon from Wisconsin on these
charges.
There was also, as referenced above, each challenge as to the
validity of the underlying facts of the supposed 'noncooperation' and
whether or not 'noncooperation' was a legal reason to terminate the
plaintiff.
Finally, there was evidence of the agents' ulterior motive.
Emails showed that the agents expected Mr. Abdallah to be 'non-
cooperative' in his interview. Those same emails also show that the
agents expected him to be terminated for his 'noncooperation.' At
least one email also stated that the agents were 'leaving the door
open' for further contact with the plaintiff after he was terminated.
The further contact was a request that the plaintiff infiltrate an Arab
owned convenience store to become an informant on possible
71 Chief among them was that the government was unlawfully citing Kalkines to
support a nonexistent duty to cooperate, rather than the actual duty to answer the
Kalkines demands. Id.
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terrorist activity. In so requesting, the agency implied that they might
be able to get Mr. Abdallah his job back if he cooperated with this
investigation.
A series of potential inferences arises from these facts. It is
clear that the government began its investigation into plaintiff
because of his race, national origin and religion. No matter how
legitimate the investigation may have been when it was begun, the
government abandoned it. However, the agents who conducted it
then consulted with legal counsel and went back after Mr. Abdallah
one more time for a 'Kalkines' interview. Because the agents clearly
expected Mr. Abdulla to be non-cooperative-and consequently
terminated-it is reasonable to infer that they planned to get Mr.
Abdallah terminated in order to use him in their other investigation.
Again, there can be no doubt that the government could not have
used Mr. Christiansen, the devout Wisconsin Mormon in the same
way. The inference this evidence supports is that the government did
this to Mr. Abdallah because of his race, national origin and religion.
It should be clear that Mr. Abdallah had ample evidence sup-
porting his claim of discrimination. The McDonnell Douglas analysis
shows that Mr. Abdallah should have been able to present this
evidence to a jury for adjudication. After all, this is far more evi-
dence that Mr. Green had mustered against McDonnell Douglas in
his case.
Mr. Abdallah's case was dismissed in summary judgment.72
Given the teachings of McDonnell Douglas outlined above,
Mr. Abdallah clearly should have had his case adjudicated by a jury.
So why did the court grant of summary judgment?
The answer is that the contemporary articulations of the
prima facie elements are imprecise, compelling plaintiffs to 'front-
load' all of their evidence into their prima facie case. This might not
be fatal in and of itself, but a pair of fundamentally flawed Second
Circuit decisions falsely teach the District Courts that a primafacie
case is a little if any probative value.73 This leads courts, as it did
72Abdallah, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
71 "Such a limited prima facie case does not necessarily have much force in
showing discrimination." Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d at 1336 (abrogated by Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)).
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here, to dismiss any and all evidence raised in support of the prima
facie case as de minimus, ergo useless.
Thus the Court reasoned:
Applying these propositions to the record presented on
summary judgment in this case, the court finds that plaintiffs
minimal prima facie showing, combined with his failure to
come forward with any evidence from which a fact finder
could rationally conclude that CBP's stated reasons for dis-
charging him were false, falls far short of the standards out-
lined in Reeves, Fisher, and James for requiring submission
75of the case to a jury.
The District Court relied on the teachings of Fisher and
James to hold that aprimafacie case is insufficient in and of itself to
raise an inference of discrimination after the LNDR been articula-
ted.76 In doing so, the court falsely presumed that all evidence of
74 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (9th ed. 2009) (defined as "of a fact or thing so
insignificant that a court my overlook it in deciding an issue or a case").
75Abdallah, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 209-10.
76 Id. at 209 ("In James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2000),
the Second Circuit considered whether the holding in Reeves was consistent with
the holding in Fisher, in which the circuit court rejected the proposition previously
outlined in Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 1995) "that
evidence satisfying McDonnell Douglas 's minimal requirements of a prima facie
case plus evidence from which a factfinder could find that the employer's explana-
tion was false necessarily requires submission to the jury." James, 233 F.3d at 156-
57. The Second Circuit reasoned that application of the Binder rule "would illogic-
ally permit a plaintiff to prevail notwithstanding the absence of evidence capable of
supporting a finding of discrimination." Id. at 154. This is because the prima facie
requirements of McDonnell Douglas "are so minimal that they do not necessarily
support any inference of discrimination; and there are so many reasons why
employers give false reasons for an adverse employment action that evidence
contradicting the employer's given reason-without more-does not necessarily
give logical support to an inference of discrimination." Id. The circuit court further
recognized that in some circumstances, a prima facie showing plus proof of falsity
might provide "powerful evidence of discrimination ... but in others, the two
together might fall far short of providing evidence from which a reasonable infer-
ence of discrimination could be drawn." Id. "The essential point ... [is] that
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discriminatory intent, which was 'frontloaded' into the plaintiffs
prima facie case, was of de minimus value. There is no Supreme
Court support for such a proposition.
The court simultaneously granted the defendant an implicit
presumption of the veracity and probative value of its LNDR. In
other words, rather than accepting the primafacie evidence as suffi-
cient for an inference of discrimination, even with the articulation of
the LNDR, the court instead presumed that the primafacie evidence
was insufficient. The court also, and erroneously, presumed that any
evidence that supported the prima facie case was implicitly incapable
of being used to challenge the LNDR. The court consequently, and
erroneously, also presumed that additional evidence was therefore
needed.
So, rather than accepting that a primafacie case and a LNDR
create a question of fact that allows a jury to decide between the two,
the court erroneously determined that the prima facie case was
intrinsically worthless and the alleged LNDR was presumptively
valid. The court, therefore, concluded that a jury could only believe
the defendant.
No Supreme Court case law supports this analysis. But,
unfortunately, the Second Circuit cases Fisher and James and their
derivatives demand it. They are wrong, and they directly contribute
to unlawful summary judgments against discrimination plaintiffs in
direct defiance of the Supreme Court.
Nor was this case an isolated incident. Fisher and James and
their derivatives have been cited thousands of times, primarily in
support of summary judgment against discrimination plaintiffs.
employers should not be held liable for discrimination in the absence of evidence
supporting a reasonable finding of discrimination."). Id. at 154-55; Abdallah, 909 F.
Supp. 2d at 209.
77 "The Supreme Court has never called a Title VII prima facie case "de minimis."
Burdine called it "not onerous," 450 U.S. at 253, and Hicks called the requirements
"minimal," 509 U.S. at 506, which may simply mean at the low end of a traditional
range." Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting) (abrogated by
Reeves, 530 U.S. 120).
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II. THE REDEFINING OF THE ELEMENTS OF
THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
As described above, the basic primafacie case under McDon-
nell Douglas requires 1) the identification of a protected class, 2) the
identification adverse action, and 3) the disposal of the most common
reasons for the adverse action. However, in the proceeding case study,
the District Court used a different articulation of the primafacie case.
Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that:
(1) he was in a protected group; (2) he was qualified for the
position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action;
and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
To be sure, the first and third elements in this articulation do
conform to the McDonnell Douglas standard. The second element
was one of two mechanics that was identified in McDonnell Douglas
for the purpose of disposing of the most common reasons for the
adverse action. It may or may not be applicable to all adverse actions.
In Mr. Abdallah's case, it most closely resembles showing that he
was performing duties satisfactorily. Thus, this articulation has begun
its divergence from McDonnell Douglas standard, but is not yet
fatally flawed.
The main problem is the fourth element. The fourth element
of the articulation above is incredibly broad. On its face, it demands
that all evidence that could support an inference of discrimination to
be raised in the prima facie case. It led to Mr. Abdallah's 'front-
loading' of all of his evidence into the prima facie case. Of course,
the ultimate question is whether or not the plaintiff can prove
discrimination. This articulation on its face seems in line with this
ultimate burden. 'Frontloading' evidence, therefore, shouldn't be a
problem since all of this evidence is properly used to both support a
7 8Abdallah, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
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finding of discrimination and to attack the defendant's proffered
LNDR.
But, when the court adds in hidden presumptions in favor of
the defendant this is a gigantic problem. Presuming the primafacie
evidence is of de minimus value defeats the purpose of McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting paradigm. Neither is there any support for
this proposition in any Supreme Court law. 9 Yet, when employed,
this false mechanic has the effect of raising the plaintiff s burden to a
potentially insurmountable level.
If the plaintiff s prima facie case was supported only with
evidence disposing of the most common reasons for the adverse
action, this false de minimis mechanic might not be fatal. But,
coupled with the misleading articulation quoted above, and the
inevitable 'frontloading' this mis-articulation demands, it leads to an
inescapable, however false, conclusion that the plaintiff s evidence is
insufficient to support a verdict.
Thus, this articulation coupled with the false teachings of
Fisher and James, is designed to render it effectively impossible for a
plaintiff to prove discrimination with circumstantial evidence. In
other words, these two components, wrought by the Second Circuit,
work an insidious, defacto, abrogation of McDonnell Douglass.
This articulation of the fourth element has, unfortunately,
become standard, at least within the Second Circuit.80 This articula-
tion of the fourth element also, coincidentally, facially disproves the
majority's opinion in Fisher.81
79 "The Supreme Court has never called a Title VII prima facie case "de minimis."
Burdine called it "not onerous," 450 U.S. at 253, and Hicks called the requirements
"minimal," 509 U.S. at 506, which may simply mean at the low end of a traditional
range." Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting) (abrogated by
Reeves, 530 U.S. 120).
80 "The Second Circuit requires a plaintiff to show that she or he (1) is a member of
a protected class; (2) who is qualified for the position; (3) who suffered an adverse
employment action; (4) under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimi-
nation." Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A
Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L.
REv. 659, 663 (1998).
81 "Since those facts are sufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination,
they cannot cease to have such an effect simply because the employer has proffered
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Judge Chin has argued that these changes in the prima facie
articulation constitute an evolution of the law.82 But, the prima facie
elements were defined by the Supreme Court. As a result only the
Supreme Court may 'evolve' it.83 But, the 'new' law Judge Chin
refers to is a creation of district and circuit courts. It does not and
cannot change the articulation in McDonnell Douglas. Yet, clearly at
least one circuit judge thinks it does. Coupled the false teachings of
Fisher and James, this 'new' law does not constitute an evolution. It
is a rebellion.
Supreme Court has never held that any of its subsequent case
law modifies the prima facie elements established in McDonnell
Douglas. In fact the Court reiterated the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case while this article was in editing.84 To be sure, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that "the prima facie case method estab-
lished in McDonnell Douglas was 'never intended to be rigid, mech-
anized, or ritualistic.',, 85 But this only means the prima facie case's
burden of "eliminate[ing] the most common nondiscriminatory
reasons for the plaintiffs [adverse action]" 86 may need to be pursued
with different mechanics depending on the specific adverse action.
The Supreme Court has never acknowledged that disproving the
most common reasons for an adverse action no longer sufficient to
support a prima facie case.
Lest some advocate of Judge Chin's theory of evolution
argue that Hicks or Reeves acknowledge exactly that, it is incumbent
an explanation ... it does not deprive these facts of their capacity to support an
inference of discrimination if the fact-finder finds these facts proven and then
chooses to draw such an inference." Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1363 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
82 Chin & Golinsky, supra note 74, at 664.
83 "We reaffirm that '[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case,
yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions."' Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237
(1997).
84Youngv. UPS, 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015).
15Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715.
16 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
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to analyze what the Supreme Court actually said about the prima
facie articulations in those cases.
In Hicks, the
Petitioners do not challenge the District Court's finding that
respondent satisfied the minimal requirements of such a prima
facie case (set out in McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, 93
S.Ct. at 1824-1825) by proving (1) that he is black, (2) that he
was qualified for the position of shift commander, (3) that he
was demoted from that position and ultimately discharged,
and (4) that the position remained open and was ultimately
filled by a white man. 756 F.Supp., at 1249-1250. 7
Likewise in Reeves,
It is undisputed that petitioner satisfied this burden here:
(i) at the time he was fired, he was a member of the class
protected by the ADEA ("individuals who are at least 40
years of age," 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)), (ii) he was otherwise
qualified for the position of Hinge Room supervisor,
(iii) he was discharged by respondent, and (iv) respon-
dent successively hired three persons in their thirties to
fill petitioner's position. See 197 F.3d, at 691-692."
In St. Mary's and Reeves, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that there was no dispute as to the sufficiency of the finding prima
facie cases by the District Courts. Thus, the issue of the specific
articulation was not before them. Having made that acknowledg-
ment, the Supreme Court moved on to the actual issues that these
opinions decided.
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed any sea
change in the mechanics of articulation of the prima facie case, no
lower court can presume that such a change has occurred. After all,
"if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet
"
7Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506.
" Reeves, 530 US at 142.
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appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions,
the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions.' ' 9 And the Supreme Court has reiterated the exact McDonnell
Douglas articulation as valid just this year.90
The lower courts are not empowered to determine that any
sort of 'evolution' has occurred regarding prima facie articulations
without an explicit rule on that point by the Supreme Court. There
has been no such ruling. Thus, there has been no 'evolution.' But, as
Fisher and James show, there has been a rebellion.
IH. THE FISHER AND JAMES FALLACY
A. Fisher-The Second Circuit's Attempts to
Rewrite the Law of McDonnell Douglass,
Burdine, and Hicks
Fisher v. Vassar College was an en banc decision by the
Second Circuit. It could be said to represent a coup d'etat, over-
throwing previous Second Circuit precedent that more closely
conformed with the McDonnell Douglas paradigm outlined above. 91
The panel decision below overturned the District Court's bench
trial's finding of intentional discrimination. The en banc court sat to
review the panel's decision. Apparently, one of the judges died while
the court was still deliberating. Whatever the effect of that unfor-
89 Felton, 521 U.S. at 237.
90 Youngv. UPS, 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015).
91 Such as Binder ("Resort to a pretextual explanation is, like flight from the scene
of a crime, evidence indicating consciousness of guilt, which is, of course, evidence
of illegal conduct. In so stating, we do not exclude the possibility that an employer
may explain away the proffer of a pretextual reason for an unfavorable employment
decision. See Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260 n. 3 (1st Cir.
1994). Such an explanation might include, for example, protection of a business
secret or even protection of the reputation of an employee who had engaged in
undesirable conduct. No such explanation was offered in the instant matter.").
Binder, 57 F.3d at 200.
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tunate circumstance, the actual outcome was a hotly contested battle
about the meaning of the term prima facie case.92
While the flawed reasoning of Fisher could be evaluated for
pages and pages, and to a great extent was by the dissents, the
fundamental flaw was the majority's ruling that McDonnell Douglas
created a heretofore unknown third type of prima facie case that was
applicable only for discrimination plaintiffs. The support for this
ruling was anemic at best.
The majority states "the phrase 'prima facie case'-as foot-
note 7 of Burdine says-is used in McDonnell Douglas not 'to
describe the plaintiffs burden of producing enough evidence to
permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue,' but rather to 'denote
the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption."
93
To the contrary, the Supreme Court language the majority
refers to specifically refute the majority's ruling.
"The phrase 'prima facie case' not only may denote the
establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable pre-
sumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the
plaintiff s burden of producing enough evidence to permit
the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. 9 J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 2494 (3d ed. 1940). McDonnell Douglas
should have made it apparent that in the Title VII context
we use "prima facie case" in the former sense.94
Disturbingly, the majority in Fisher actually cited the entirety
of this language. 95 Unfortunately, no one in the majority appears to
have bothered to actually read Wigmore. 96 While the dissents make
92 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1369. (Judges Jacobs and Leval wrote the majority opinion,
with a total of six judges concurring. Judge Jacobs also wrote a special, separate
concurrence. There was another partially concurring opinion, as well as two
scathing dissent's which were each joined by four judges).9 3 
_[d. at 1341.
94 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 260.9 5 id.
96 Nor is there any indication that the dissents looked up Wigmore, given that the
treatise is not cited anywhere else in any of the opinions.
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strong arguments in favor of the position that there are, and always
have been, only two types of prima facie case, the controlling fact is
that the Supreme Court identified two types of prima facie case then
cited to Wigmore to define them.
There are only two types of prima facie case identified by
Wigmore. The Supreme Court specifically identified which of them
applied to McDonnell Douglas discrimination cases. This bears
repeating since the Second Circuit has evidently missed this point for
nearly two decades.
97
To reiterate: "The phrase 'prima facie case' not only may
denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable pre-
sumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiffs
burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to
infer the fact at issue. 98 McDonnell Douglas should have made it
apparent that in the Title VII context we use "primafacie case" in the
former sense." 99
The Supreme Court identified two types of prima facie case
and cited to Wigmore to define them. Nothing in the cited language,
or anywhere else in Supreme Court jurisprudence, identifies a third
type of prima facie case. Thus, the Second Circuit manifestly
exceeded its authority in concluding that there was a third type of
primafacie case, one that created a legally mandatory presumption
but was otherwise not intrinsically sufficient to raise an inference of
discrimination. 100
Even if the language the majority cites arguably supported a
finding of a third type of prima facie case, the Second Circuit is not
empowered to find that a third type exists without explicit language
to that effect from the Supreme Court. "If a precedent of this Court
97 Fisher was decided in 1997, and still in 2014 (or at least 2013) 17 (or 16) years
later the Second Circuit still cites to Fisher and its third type of prima facie case.
98 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2494 (3d ed. 1940).
99 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
100 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1340 abrogated by Reeves, 530 U.S. 133 (noting "Chief
Judge Newman's dissent is based largely on his surprising view, shared by Judge
Winter, that the prima facie case of discrimination specified in McDonnell Douglas
is as strong as any conventional prima facie case.").
120
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has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected
in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow
the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative
of overruling its own decisions." 101 The Second Circuit has
attempted to usurp this prerogative.
Consequently, district courts are obligated to recognize this
usurpation and "to recognize that the motion[s based upon it] ha[ve]
to be denied unless and until this Court reinterpret[s] the binding
precedent."
10 2
B. The James Panel's Faulty Resurrection of
Fisher
Fisher appeared to have died the death it deserved when the
Supreme Court addressed the so-called pretext-plus analysis in
Reeves. This appeared to be a great victory for plaintiffs: yet, a three-
judge panel of the Second Circuit, coincidentally comprised of the
two main authors of the Fisher majority decision, snatched defeat
from the jaws of victory when they held that "upon careful study of
the Reeves opinion, we can find no indication in it that the Supreme
Court has rejected what we said in Fisher.,10 3
This is an astonishing holding given the actual language in
Reeves and Fisher. The differences between Reeves and the majority
opinion in Fisher, as well as the corresponding similarities between
Reeves and the Newman dissent in Fisher, will be discussed below.
As an initial matter, however, note must be taken of the evidently
false statement of fact that the James panel propagated.
In Fisher, the majority stated that:
During consideration of the Petition for Rehearing in
Banc, a question was raised whether our review for clear
error violated a rule established in Binder v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193 (2d Cir.1995). A majority of
101 Felton, 521 U.S. at 237-38.
12 _[d. at 238.
103 James, 233 F.3d at 156.
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the Court has decided to limit in banc review to resolution
of the question whether a finding of liability under Title
VII, supported by a prima facie case and a sustainable
finding of pretext, is subject to review for clear error.104
Thus, the court specifically declined to rule on the continued
applicability of Binder. After all, Fisher was a ruling on a JNOV,
whereas, Binder was a ruling on summary judgment i.e. the suffi-
ciency to go to a fact finder in the first place. As such, Binder was
actually a Second Circuit ruling in conformity with the McDonnell
Douglas analysis outlined above. 105
After having declined to rule on the Binder precedent in
Fisher, the James panel stated that Fisher had in fact overturned
Binder. 106 In so doing, the panel propagated an overt falsehood about
the prior holding in Fisher.
At the very least, an error of this magnitude about what the
authors themselves said in a decision that they clearly considered
vital calls into question their evaluation of the Supreme Court's
meaning in Reeves. Yet the bulk of the James decision purports to do
exactly that, saying that "the Supreme Court's reasoning in Reeves is
wholly compatible and harmonious with our reasoning in Fisher.,
10 7
But the James panel undercuts its own reasoning. It recognizes that
Reeves appears to disagree with Fisher. 10 8 But the panel then states
104 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1333. Compare Fisher, with James, 233 F.3d at 153 (noting
the Court "convened in banc in Fisher to reconsider our earlier precedent in Binder,
57 F.3d at 193.").
105 "The Court held that while a trier of fact's rejection of the employer's asserted
reasons does not compel a finding for the plaintiff, it permits the trier to infer discri-
mination. Put another way, 'rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is
enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimination.' Binder, 57 F.3d at 199
(quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 n. 4 (emphasis in original))."
106 James, 233 F.3d at 153 (noting "Fisher rejected the Binder standard, finding it
both illogical and incompatible with the Supreme Court's guidance.").
107 James, 233 F.3d at 155.
108 "As the Schnabel opinion points out the Supreme Court in Reeves introduced
some confusion as to the meaning of the Fisher opinion. The [Reeves] Court stated
that it was granting certiorari to resolve the conflict among circuits as to whether a
prima facie case plus evidence of the falsity of the employer's proffered justifica-
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that "[w]ith all respect the Court was mistaken." 10 9 Ultimately con-
cluding that "[t]here is no inconsistency between the two rulings." 110
But as other commentators have said, this conclusion is not a
reasonable one. "Both the First and Second Circuits... have uncon-
vincingly denied the existence of any conflict between the Reeves
opinion in their own pre-Reeves jurisprudence, even though both cir-
cuits were clearly among those that endorsed the discredited 'pretext-
plus' approach." '111 Although Reeves in its broadest and most general
statements might facially appear to be in agreement with Fisher's
broadest and most general statements, 112 review of the more detailed
statements of Reeves show that the Supreme Court's reasoning
follows almost exactly with Judge Newman's dissent in Fisher rather
than the majority's opinion. In short, the James panels' evaluation of
Fisher "was so ridden with error that [the panel] could not honestly
have relied upon it.",
113
Compare the following examples from the Reeves decision as
against the majority and the dissent from Fisher.
The Fisher majority believes that the McDonnell Douglas
primafacie case, unlike all other primafacie cases, is not sufficient
in and of itself to raise an inference of discrimination.
tion is adequate to sustain a finding of liability. In a parenthetical clause following
its citation to Fisher, the Court described Fisher as requiring that plaintiffs 'intro-
duce sufficient evidence for jury to find both that employer's reason was false and
that real reason was discrimination."' See James, 233 F.3d at 157 n.3 (internal cita-
tions omitted) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 140).
109 James, 233 F.3d at 157 n. 3.
11
° -d. at 155
... JANICE GOODMAN, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION: PLEADING AND PRACTICE,
Ch. 2, Title VII, § 2.05(2)(v)(vi) n. 100 (Christopher Bello ed., 2013) (Lexis
Advance).
112 Reeves even cites Fisher positively, stating "[I]f the circumstances show that the
defendant gave the false explanation to conceal something other than discrimina-
tion, the inference of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent." Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 148 (quoting Fisher, 114 F.3d, at 1338).
113 Liebermanv. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Reeves: "Again, the court disregarded critical evidence
favorable to petitioner-namely, the evidence supporting
petitioner's prima facie case."
114
Fisher (Majority): "Such a limited prima facie case does not
necessarily have much force in showing discrimination."
' 15
Fisher (Dissent): "They are the Supreme Court's own
example of facts sufficient, in the Supreme Court's words, to
'give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. , 116
The Fisher majority's belief in "such a limited prima facie
case," aside from having been disproved above, does not mesh the
Supreme Court analysis of "critical evidence favorable to peti-
tioner-namely, the evidence supporting petitioner's prima facie
case." If the prima facie case actually had such a limited probative
value as the Fisher majority believes, the Reeves court would not
consider it critical evidence. The dissent's analysis makes far more
sense in conjunction Reeves than the majority's.
Likewise, the Fisher majority's belief that a showing of
pretext mustpoint to discrimination is entirely at odds the decision in
Reeves.
Reeves: "it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the
employer's explanation."
1 17
Fisher (Majority): "When the presumption drops away,
plaintiffs burden is enlarged to include every element of the
claim . . . plaintiff must then (unlike the prima facie stage)
point to sufficient evidence to reasonably support a finding
that he was harmed by the employer's illegal discrimina-
tion." 118
114 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 152.
115 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1336, abrogated by Reeves, 530 U.S. 133.
116 Id. at 1363; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added).
117 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
118Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1337.
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Fisher (Dissent): "When the Supreme Court says in St.
Mary's, as all other courts have also said, that a fact-finder
may infer discrimination from a finding of pretext, it is
obviously in no doubt as to the direction in which a pretext
finding points. Moreover, the Supreme Court's assertion that
an inference of discrimination may be drawn from a finding
of pretext, without any additional evidence required from the
plaintiff, necessarily means that the pretext finding generally
points toward discrimination with considerable force, enough
force to enable the plaintiff to win"'1 19
Consider the same principle as to the probative value of a showing of
pretext in his comparative examples.
Reeves: "Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy
of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence
that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be
quite persuasive." 120
Fisher (Majority): "We have seen that, while a prima facie
case and a finding of pretext may in some cases powerfully
show discrimination, neither one necessarily gives plaintiff
much support in discharging his obligation to prove that he
was the victim of discrimination."
' 121
Fisher (Dissent): "Thus, the panel opinion is quite wrong to
assert that the pretext finding made by the District Court in
this case "points nowhere." On the contrary, it starts out
pointing in the same direction that all pretext findings point-
toward the finding of discrimination that is inferable from the
facts constituting the plaintiffs prima facie case."
' 122
Again on the same point
119 Id. at 1372-73.
120 See id. at 517 ("[P]roving the employer's reason false becomes part of (and
often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was
intentional discriminatiof'); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.121 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1338.
122Id. at 1372.
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Reeves: "the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity
of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover
up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent
with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder
is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material
fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt." 
123
Fisher (Majority): "a Title VII plaintiff may prevail only if
an employer's proffered reasons are shown to be a pretextfor
discrimination, either because the pretext finding itself points
to discrimination or because other evidence in the record
points in that direction-or both." 
124
Fisher (Dissent): "The reason for permitting an inference of
discrimination from a finding of pretext is evident. In the
context of Title VII lawsuits, the likely motivation for a
defendant, called upon in court to proffer an explanation for
its adverse employment action, to proffer a pretextual
explanation is to hide the true explanation of discrimina-
tion." 
12 5
And again on the same point
Reeves: "Once the employer's justification has been elimi-
nated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best
position to put forth the actual reason for its decision."
' 126
Fisher (Majority): "What the panel opinion meant by
"points nowhere" was that the inaccuracies in Vassar's state-
ments are explicable by so many equally possible motiva-
123 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; Wright v. West 505 U.S. 277, 296, 112 S.Ct. 2482,
120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992); see also Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 620-21,
16 S.Ct. 895, 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896); 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 278(2), p. 133 (J.
Chadboum rev. 1979).124 Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1339.125 
_d. at 1372.
126 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
126
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tions that none emerged with any persuasive force; more par-
ticularly, the panel concluded that under the circumstances
Vassar's inaccuracies gave little if any support to the infer-
ence that Vassar had engaged in discrimination." 
127
Fisher (Dissent): "But once it proffers its reason in court, it
subjects that reason to the assessment of the fact-finder, and
if the fact-finder concludes, with support in the record, that
the proffered reason is a pretext, the defendant is usually at
risk of having the fact-finder draw the permissible inference
that the pretextual reason was proffered to hide the true
reason-discrimination." 
128
Perhaps the most telling failure of reasoning by the James
panel was in regard to the possibility that a prima facie case in
showing pretext might not sustain a jury verdict. On its face, in the
broadest possible terms, this proposition is stated by both Reeves and
Fisher. But the James panel evidently ignored the examples which
the Supreme Court used to illustrate their meaning on the point, a
meaning which is wholly different from that espoused by the Fisher
majority.
Reeves: "This is not to say that such a showing by the
plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of
liability. Certainly there will be instances where, although the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth
sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no
rational factfinder could conclude that the action was
discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled
to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively
revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak
issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue
127 Fisher, 114 F.3d 1332, 1345 (2d Cir. 1997) abrogated by Reeves, 530 U.S. 133
(2000).
128 id.
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and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent
evidence that no discrimination had occurred."
' 129
Fisher (Majority): "But discrimination does not lurk behind
every inaccurate statement. Individual decision-makers may
intentionally dissemble in order to hide a reason that is non-
discriminatory but unbecoming or small-minded, such as
back-scratching, log-rolling, horse-trading, institutional poli-
tics, envy, nepotism, spite, or personal hostility ... In short,
the fact that the proffered reason was false does not neces-
sarily mean that the true motive was the illegal one argued by
the plaintiff."13 °
Fisher (Dissent): "The majority relies on the large number of
reasons why a pretext explanation could be proffered as a
circumstance for diminishing the force of the pretext finding
that was made by the District Court .... In every case where
a person is seen running from the scene of a crime, the jury is
instructed that they may, but need not, draw an inference that
such flight is probative of consciousness of guilt, and that
state of mind, in turn, is probative of ultimate guilt (though
not alone sufficient to convict). Of course, the strength of the
inference from flight will depend on all of the evidence in the
case. If there is some slight evidence of an innocent explana-
tion for the flight, the inference of consciousness of guilt
might be lessened. If the evidence of an innocent explanation
is strong, the inference of consciousness of guilt will be
weak. And cases might arise where the evidence of an inno-
cent explanation is so strong that no reasonable fact-finder
could draw the inference of consciousness of guilt, in which
event a finding based on the inference would be clearly
erroneous." 131
129Reeves, 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
130 Fisher, 114 F.3d 1332, 1345 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Reeves, 530 U.S. 133
(2000).
131 Id.
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While the Supreme Court acknowledged that there might be circum-
stances where a primafacie case coupled with a showing of pretext
might not ultimately be sufficient to prove intentional discrimination,
they would be presumptively rare. Such as when evidence "conclu-
sively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employer's decision" or "there was abundant and uncontroverted
independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred."
These are circumstances where powerful evidence in the
record at trial conclusively identifies some other reason for the pre-
text. Not, as the Fisher majority would have it, whenever speculation
on the part of the hostile court can articulate some other conceivable
reason even though unsupported by any evidence. This is exactly
where Judge Newman was headed with the argument that "numbers
of possibilities have little to do with probative force." Again, the
Reeves decision cleaves far more closely to the Fisher dissent than it
does to the Fisher majority.
If the James panel's assertion that "[t]here is no inconsistency
between the two rulings"132 were subjected to the same summary
judgment standard that discrimination plaintiffs are held to, 'no
reasonable jurist could conclude that the assertion in James is
supported by sufficient evidence.'
IV. FISHER AND JAMES HAVE HAD FAR-
REACHING DELETERIOUS CONSEQUEN-
CES FOR DISCRIMINTION PLAINTIFFS
The Abdallah case critiqued above was not just a flash in the
pan. Rather, it was just another in a long line of perfectly valid
discrimination cases that is been destroyed by Fisher and James and
their derivatives. A quick the referral to the Westlaw database shows
that each of these cases has been cited nearly a thousand times. That
is a broad reach for such erroneously decided cases of the course of a
132James, 233 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2000).
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decade and a half Nor is James the only circuit decision that has
defied the command of Reeves.
133
In further illustration of the destructive reach, consider the
following pair of cases. A recent decision by The Western District of
New York disposed of a plaintiffs case on summary judgment
because "[a] jury cannot infer discrimination from thin air." 134 The
judge was quoting the Second Circuit's decision in Norton.135 The
Norton panel held that
[A] jury cannot infer discrimination from thin air. And thin air
is all the plaintiff has produced in the case before us. Norton
proved (1) that he was over forty years old when he was fired;
(2) that the person who fired him was under forty years of
age; and (3) that one other person who was fired around the
same time as Norton was also over forty. Norton further
suggested that the principal reason offered by Sam's Club for
his dismissal (his having taken one long lunch) was prepos-
terous. Norton established, at best, an extremely weak prima
facie case.136
The panel was evidently offended by what it perceived to be the
extreme weakness of the prima facie case.
137
133 "The practice in the first and second circuits of more or less ignoring Reeves
commands has also been reflected in Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16 (1st
Cir. 2000); Schnabel, 232 F.3d 83; Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp.,
248 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001); Weinstock v. Colombia Univ., 224 F.3d 33 (2d Cir.
2000); and Budde v. H and K S Distrib. Co., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15811 (2d Cir.
2000) (unpubl.)." Goodman, Employee Rights Litigation: Pleading and Practice 2-
175 [2009]
134 Grant v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 10-CV-6384, 2013 WL 3105536 (W.D.N.Y.
June 18, 2013).
135 Nortonv. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir 1998).136 id.
137 "Norton established, at best, an extremely weak prima facie case. It is not
infrequent that people who are dismissed are fired by managers who differ from
them in some respect-managers who are younger or older, or of a different race or
gender. If that fact, without more, could suffice to support the finding of discrimi-
130
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The panel cited to Fisher to hold that "even if the jury could
find that the explanation offered by Sam's Club for why it fired
Norton was absurd, it is hard to see how this would add much of
significance to Norton's case.'"138 This is, again, directly refuted by
the Supreme Court's holding that "the trier of fact can reasonably
infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissemb-
ling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is con-
sistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is
entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as
"affirmative evidence of guilt., 139 Whether the primafacie case was
weak or not, a showing of falsity, or in this case 'absurdity,' permits
the ultimate finding of discrimination.
As it happens, the Norton case was presided over at the
district court level by the same judge as in Grant.14 In Norton, the
case went to trial and the plaintiff won a verdict and damages. But
again, relying on Fisher, the Second Circuit snatched defeat from the
jaws of victory, hijacking the plaintiffs jury verdict and casting it
away in favor of the flawed reasoning of Fisher. When fifteen years
later in Grant, the district court disposed of that case through
summary judgment rather than letting it go to trial as he did in
Norton, it may be said that the judge learned the lesson that the
Second Circuit sought to teach him. A lesson that relied on the false
teachings of Fisher.
V. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit, through Fisher and James, has led a
rebellion against the well-settled Supreme Court case law of McDon-
nell Douglass and its progeny. In doing so, the Second Circuit has
either ignored or abandoned the basic principles underlying
McDonnell Douglas: the important national policy that Title VII is
designed to effectuate and the rarity of overt evidence of discrimi-
nation in the instant case, it would be hard to imagine a termination that could not
be attributed to discrimination." Id.
138 id.
139Reeves, 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).
14' Norton, 145 F.3d at 119.
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natory intent because discriminating employers go out of their way to
hide such evidence. This has led to an unlawful increase in the evi-
dentiary standard that plaintiffs must meet either to overcome sum-
mary judgment or even to sustain a verdict after trial. This unlawfully
heightened standard works an insidious effect against plaintiffs,
essentially demanding that the District Court's grant summary judg-
ment in the vast majority of cases.
Through the false reasoning of Fisher and James the Second
Circuit has evidently abandoned its duty to root out "subtle" discri-
mination. 141 Given the profound rarity of overt evidence of discrimi-
nation, "subtle" cases make up the vast majority of discrimination
cases. Thus, Fisher and James close the courthouse doors upon the
vast majority of discrimination plaintiffs in direct contravention of
Title VII's mandate.
Clearly, within this circuit, corrective action must be taken.
Given the Second Circuit's evident refusal to adhere to Reeves, it
would appear that the Second Circuit needs to police itself abroga-
ting Fisher and James. But, even at the district level, courts are
obligated to recognize this usurpation and "to recognize that the
motion[s based upon it] ha[ve] to be denied unless and until [The
Supreme] Court reinterpret[s] the binding precedent." 142
141 "[lIt is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise." McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
142 Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1997).
